Thursday, August 10, 2006

Whitehead and Derrida

Edward Berge Says:August 9th, 2006 at 7:42 am e For example, see this article on how pomo’s idea of creative play has parallel’s with Whitehead’s process philosophy, all without some metaphysical God or Spirit. In the Wake of False Unifications: Whitehead’s Creative Resistance against Imperialist Theologies Roland Faber, Claremont, March 31, 2005
Edward Berge Says: August 9th, 2006 at 12:51 pm Faber in the above aritcle makes clear that Whitehead shares with pomoers like Derrida the idea that unity is “always only a finite element in an infinite, rhizomatic process’ (12). Then he warns that this might lead to relativism and nihilism, or what Griffin calls “eliminative pluralism.” (The MGM to you Wilberries.) To combat this we must “suspend multiplicity by inter/communication, différance with the other-inrelation” (12). Again, this is typical of Derrida’s works. But of course there is another warning, that inter/communication might lead to a new form of imperialism by holism. This is neutralized or suspended by spontaneous creativity. An ultimate ontological reality is always deferred through the cyclic process above. Again, Derrida in a nutshell.
Edward Berge Says: August 9th, 2006 at 6:06 pm From “Whitehead, Deconstruction and Postmodernism” by Luis G. Pedraja, Process Studies, pp. 68-84, Vol. 28, Number 1/2, Spring - Summer, 1999:
While Griffin’s interpretation of Whitehead merits serious consideration, it still attempts to salvage a “centeredness” which is difficult to maintain in Whitehead’s philosophy. It is true that Whitehead wants to recover certain metaphysical categories and to develop a constructive project. This is part of his attempt to develop a comprehensive interpretive system (PR 3-4) and his desire to combat the anti-rationalistic fallacy.
However, we also must recognize that Whitehead’s critique of modernism radically deconstructs the possibility of an unbiased, axiomatic center that can be abstracted from the whole. This does not mean that Whitehead advocates a radical relativism or a denial of freedom like some advocates of deconstruction. But neither does Derrida’s philosophy in its basic presuppositions advocate a radical relativism and a denial of freedom as some of his interpreters propose.
What they both advocate is a suspicion of abstractions that pose as absolute universal truths as well as philosophy’s failure to recognize the limitations of its particular contextual perspectives and standpoints. Underlying this suspicion of abstract absolute truths is a shift in their respective philosophies from Western views that give primacy to being permanence, presents, space, detachment, and individual substance, toward views that incorporate becoming, change, time, interrelations and fluidity. Open Integral

No comments:

Post a Comment