Wednesday, February 04, 2015

Unearthing Indian thought and culture

This is a brilliant – and unfortunately all-too-rare recognition of the extent to which supposedly “neutral” neuroscience is pervaded by underlying assumptions from the Western philosophic position. Though not a philosopher (I’m a clinical psychologist) I attempted to point to some of the limitations and pitfalls in contemporary attempts to integrate Indian philosophic/psychological ideas with contemporary science:
http://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/i_es/i_es_salmo_psych_frameset.htm - http://www.remember-to-breathe.org

mike February 2, 2015 at 2:54 am
Hi Don, when it all comes down to greed, then the state of the ‘economy’ probably doesn’t mean much. lf you believe, as l do that the ‘Global Economy’ is controlled by a few rich bankers, then all economic movement will, mostly, be determined by them and their ilk. Politicians are simply their puppets and the distribution of wealth will be syphoned off according to their agenda – which is normally self-serving. There is a book called ‘Sri Aurobindo and Karl Marx which discusses ‘economic growth’ l believe (but l haven’t read much of it). This article below l found interesting, by karen litfin. She’s based it on a comparison of:
"I draw upon the works of G.W.F. Hegel, Sri Aurobindo, Jean Gebser and Ken Wilber to trace the outlines of an alternative metaphysic to secularism. The integral worldview, which understands history as Spirit in the process of becoming, offers such an alternative, one that moves beyond but also includes the secular story within its scope”. 
Also, this was an interesting statement by Dr. Kireet Joshi, Chairman of the Governing Board and International Advisory Council: Full lnterview: http://archive.auroville.org/journals&media/avtoday/archive/2000-2003/aug_2002/kireet.htm

Patrick S. O'Donnellon 2 February 2015 at 1:04 pm said:
It seems I am (and in good company!) a member of the class of those not even “relatively educated,” but that won’t prevent me from arguing that not without ample reason has it been demonstrated that philosophizing in the Jewish tradition was utterly beholden to Islamic philosophy which, in turn, grew out of the encounter with (translation of) and reflection upon Greek philosophical writings. And Christian theology is unthinkable without both the Greek philosophical tradition and Islamic philosophy and theology. 
Indian philosophy of religious provenance, on the other hand, has a predominantly internal philosophical motivation and trajectory, similar to philosophizing in the ancient Greek world, hence one does not find the discrete developments of (or anything quite similar to) “theology” and “philosophy” in the Indic traditions. The embrace of sophisticated philosophizing within Hinduism (and Buddhism and Jainism) lacks its counterpart in the Abrahamic theistic traditions, plain and simple. Hence too, the remarkable findings and discussion in Thomas McEvilley’s The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies (2002). One can’t fault Hinduism for the fact that the scope of its most significant and “foundational” texts is a bit broader than the Rg Veda and far richer and more philosophical than the most comparably positioned (structurally and genetically speaking) important (‘sacred’) religious texts in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Thank you for your response. I would like to add one thing about the idea that even *we* are activists of a sort.
I have some worries when the “activism” side dominates the “scholarship” side.
That is, if the idea is “My work is so (fill in the blank: “pious”, “socially just”, “devoted to the workers of the world,” “devoted to the glory of Christ”) that it should be taken seriously, it isn’t really primarily scholarship anymore. It is doing something else, and maybe something worthy, but not what you mean when you say we are “activists” I would think. Frankly, I wonder whether this mixture has led to some problematic trends in the academy–perhaps more on the level of pedagogy than research– I think it runs the danger of producing less critical thinking, not more (again, thinking more about pedagogy than research.).
I think that a way we can be called activists in a way that is apt is simply that through our “pure” scholarship, unearthing Indian thought and culture, along with work illustrating the the power dynamics that perpetuate mistaken ideas of a certain limited notion of Philosophy, we hope to effect a very specific change: that people in the academy and beyond see how much relevant good work was going on in the non-Western–in our case–Indian world.
Before I forget (as I did yesterday), thanks, Patrick for your tireless championing of Indian thought to our colleagues.

Sri Aurobindo’s insights into the topic of mental imbalances are now available in the newly released Volume 4 of the Letters of Yoga. See the section “Accidents, Possession and Madness” (pages 800-813) Click on CWSA Volume 31

Scientists have found that there is not a single type of schizophrenia, but that it consists of a group made up of eight genetically different types of diseases.]

[The Mother and Sri Aurobindo were very sensitive on the matter of compulsory vaccination. Following are references:] http://t.co/RHvm567seK

The March to Fulfil India’s Glorious Destiny Begins - My Reflections- in TNIE- http://t.co/V2cty7OU7m @malviyamit @spmrfoundation

A Critique of Whole Foods' "Conscious Capitalism": http://t.co/3KH2LD9AJc #Critique #Culture #Consumerism

Thomas Merton on Being an Intellectual, and a Message to the Poets http://t.co/NqmT5Tb83w

[much of Enlightenment is not unfinished: it has been ignored, buried or traduced. —   Alberto Toscano, Fanaticism] http://t.co/eCvr5C5ENX

@drsbasu2115 That's great but right now some activism is needed to make Sri Aurobindo sliding into general discourse. [TNM55] http://t.co/dWwdGnz2lk

@Koenraad_Elst : Hindus are Tribals, Hindus are Pagans http://t.co/rZgPtlWZmB cc @ShekharGupta
Liberation is not “selfish” but impersonal, and requires a great deal of self-abnegation, even more than Seva.
5. Only a small percentage of the Hindus even know about Mayavad, the doctrine that the world is a fata morgana created by the magic power of the gods. It is a specific philosophy of Shankara, conditioned by his struggle against Buddhist idealism (Shunyavad, “doctrine of Emptiness”), which in turn is also not the whole of Buddhism (indeed, the Buddha himself would not have recognized it as his own teaching). Shankara is widely appreciated as a great debater and as the founder of the ascetic Dashanami order, but his philosophy has few takers.

For a newly imagined 'historical temper'

The Hindu-To one history, you lift your head up, to the other kind of ... (Janaki Nair teaches historyat the Centre for Historical Studies, JNU.) Keywords: ...


Wednesday, January 28, 2015

Aquinas, Royace, and Tarski

[Sri Aurobindo himself was a master at critical thinking and encouraged anyone who came under his spell to further] http://t.co/ifVt8jX0p3

Patheos (blog) - ‎Jan 27, 2015‎ 
In a previous post about philosophy and the existence of God, I made a couple points. First, about the classical understanding of philosophy as a way of life and even, as Artur Rosman puts it, a set of spiritual exercises.
BBC News - ‎Jan 20, 2015‎ 
Michael Sandel, professor of government at Harvard University, is known globally for the rigour he brings to important ethical and philosophical questions.

Natural Kinds (Alexander Bird and Emma Tobin) [REVISED: January 27, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Spinoza's Psychological Theory (Michael LeBuffe) [REVISED: January 27, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Alfred Tarski (Mario Gómez-Torrente) [REVISED: January 27, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Environmental Aesthetics (Allen Carlson) [REVISED: January 26, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Concepts of Disease and Health (Dominic Murphy) [REVISED: January 22, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Philosophy of Psychiatry (Dominic Murphy) [REVISED: January 22, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy (Stephen Phillips) [REVISED: January 22, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Absolute and Relational Theories of Space and Motion (Nick Huggett and Carl Hoefer) [REVISED: January 22, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html 
Methodological Individualism (Joseph Heath) [REVISED: January 21, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems (Panu Raatikainen) [REVISED: January 20, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, sup2.html 
Madhyamaka (Richard Hayes) [REVISED: January 16, 2015]
Changes to: Bibliography 
Indexicals (David Braun) [REVISED: January 16, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Religion and Political Theory (Chris Eberle and Terence Cuneo) [REVISED: January 15, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html 
Mereology (Achille Varzi) [REVISED: January 15, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html 
Teleological Arguments for God's Existence (Del Ratzsch and Jeffrey Koperski) [REVISED:January 15, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html 
Propositional Dynamic Logic (Nicolas Troquard and Philippe Balbiani) [REVISED: January 13, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, bisimilar-LTS-tras.png 
John Duns Scotus (Thomas Williams) [REVISED: January 12, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
The Philosophy of Dance (Aili Bresnahan) [NEW: January 12, 2015] 
Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy (John Christman) [REVISED: January 9, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html 
Semantic Conceptions of Information (Luciano Floridi) [REVISED: January 7, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Negation (Laurence R. Horn and Heinrich Wansing) [NEW: January 7, 2015] 
Hilbert's Program (Richard Zach) [REVISED: January 6, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
The Sale of Human Organs (Stephen Wilkinson) [REVISED: January 5, 2015]
Changes to: Bibliography, Internet resources 
Physicalism (Daniel Stoljar) [REVISED: January 5, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Intuitionistic Logic (Joan Moschovakis) [REVISED: January 2, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Divine Simplicity (William F. Vallicella) [REVISED: January 2, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Philosophy of Linguistics (Barbara C. Scholz, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, and Geoffrey K. Pullum) [REVISED: January 1, 2015]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Actualism (Christopher Menzel) [REVISED: December 31, 2014]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Kevin Corrigan and L. Michael Harrington) [REVISED:December 31, 2014]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Assertion (Peter Pagin) [REVISED: December 31, 2014]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html 
Probability in Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy (Rudolf Schuessler) [NEW: December 29, 2014] 
Egoism (Robert Shaver) [REVISED: December 24, 2014]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness (Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi) [REVISED: December 24, 2014]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html 
Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value (Michael J. Zimmerman) [REVISED: December 24, 2014]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html 
Forgiveness (Paul M. Hughes) [REVISED: December 23, 2014]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Liberalism (Gerald Gaus, Shane D. Courtland, and David Schmidtz) [REVISED: December 22, 2014]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
The Philosophy of Childhood (Gareth Matthews and Amy Mullin) [REVISED: December 22, 2014]
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography 
Imprecise Probabilities (Seamus Bradley) [NEW: December 20, 2014] 
Afterlife (William Hasker and Charles Taliaferro) [REVISED: December 18, 2014] Changes are prior to December 21, 2014 (Main text, Bibliography) and are available in Winter 2014 Edition. 
Zhuangzi (Chad Hansen) [NEW: December 17, 2014] 
Voluntary Euthanasia (Robert Young) [REVISED: December 16, 2014] Changes are prior to December 21, 2014 (Main text, Bibliography) and are available in Winter 2014 Edition. 
Nationalism (Nenad Miscevic) [REVISED: December 15, 2014] Changes are prior to December 21, 2014 (Main text, Bibliography) and are available in Winter 2014 Edition. 
Nonexistent Objects (Maria Reicher) [REVISED: December 15, 2014] Changes are prior to December 21, 2014 (Main text, Bibliography, notes.html) and are available in Winter 2014 Edition. 
Intuitionism in Ethics (Philip Stratton-Lake) [NEW: December 15, 2014] 
The Problem of the Many (Brian Weatherson) [REVISED: December 14, 2014] Changes are prior to December 21, 2014 (Main text, Bibliography) and are available in Winter 2014 Edition. 

Sandra Laugier 
University of Chicago Press Reviewed by Julia Tanney, University of Kent Published: January 26, 2015 2015.01.24 
Richard Capobianco 
University of Toronto Press Reviewed by S. Montgomery Ewegen, Trinity College Published: January 26, 2015 2015.01.23 
Kelly A. Parker and Jason Bell (eds.) 
Fordham University Press Reviewed by Roger Ward, Georgetown College Published: January 25, 2015 2015.01.22 
John Oberdiek (ed.) 
Oxford University Press Reviewed by Avihay Dorfman, Tel Aviv University Published: January 25, 2015 2015.01.21 
John R. Shook and Tibor Solymosi (eds.) 
Bloomsbury Reviewed by Brian L. Keeley, Pitzer College Published: January 22, 2015 2015.01.20 
Alfred R. Mele (ed.) 
Oxford University Press Reviewed by Neil Levy, Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health/Oxford Centre for Neuroethics Published: January 22, 2015 2015.01.19 
Paul Bloomfield 
Oxford University Press Reviewed by Neera K. Badhwar, University of Oklahoma/George Mason University Published: January 21, 2015 2015.01.18 
Robert Nichols 
Stanford University Press Reviewed by Alan D. Schrift, Grinnell College Published: January 21, 2015 2015.01.17 


Saturday, January 17, 2015

Pfau, Ramey, and Wolterstorff

Justice: Rights and Wrongs – an overview | Joshua Hordern ...

www.academia.edu/3584383/Justice_Rights_and_Wrongs_an_overview
By Joshua Hordern in Political Theory and Christian Ethics. This is a non- evaluative overview of Justice: Rights and Wrongs covering its three parts: (i) an  ...

Justice: Rights and Wrongs . Nicholas Wolterstorff. Princeton, NJ 

www.religionconflictpeace.org/.../justice-rights-and-wrongs-nicholas-wolter...
Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs is an original and engaging study of justice. What is justice? According to Wolterstorff, there are two basic ...

Nicholas Wolterstorff's fear of the secular « The Immanent Frame

blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2009/02/22/nicholas-wolterstorffs-fear-of-the-secular/
Feb 22, 2009 - His latest work, Justice: Rights and Wrongs, is, in part, dedicated to correcting the Christian view that human rights talk—because it necessarily  ...

MINDING THE MODERN
http://tif.li/1IvR8Wr

In his book MINDING THE MODERN, Thomas Pfau argues that the loss of foundational concepts in classical and medieval Aristotelian philosophy caused a fateful separation between reason and will in European thought.

Read comments from Borja Vilallonga (http://tif.li/1pVrq4G), Thomas Joseph White (http://tif.li/1v7dviW), Victoria Kahn (http://tif.li/1pkL4ac), Mark Alznauer (http://tif.li/1scUQv0), Elizabeth Pritchard (http://tif.li/1wIsj8v), Paul Silas Peterson (http://tif.li/1rDoJo8), Charly Coleman (http://tif.li/1s4LOQY), Brad S. Gregory (http://tif.li/1vpBVo2), and a multipart (http://tif.li/1zc4cuY) response (http://tif.li/1x7iSx7) by Thomas Pfau.

The Hermetic Critique of Deleuze | An und für sich

itself.wordpress.com/2013/02/06/the-hermetic-critique-of-deleuze/
Feb 6, 2013 - This post is by Daniel Whistler responding to Joshua Ramey's The Hermetic Deleuze. - APS I've struggled with what follows a lot: not just ...

The Hermetic Deleuze Book Event | An und für sich

https://itself.wordpress.com/category/the-hermetic-deleuze-book-event/
Posts about The Hermetic Deleuze Book Event written by joshua ramey and Anthony Paul Smith.

Hermetic Deleuze | Becoming Integral

becomingintegral.com/2012/10/14/hermetic-deleuze/
Oct 14, 2012 - There is a great interview HERE with Joshua Ramey about his book, TheHermetic Deleuze: Philosophy and Spiritual Ordeal. The interview is a ...

Sunday, July 27, 2014

Nikam takes Sri Aurobindo to have successfully refuted māyāvāda

Christian Coseru on 26 July 2014 at 7:01 pm said: 
One thing worth noting about Aurobindo is the close association between him (and his ashram) and many pre-independence academic philosophers active in the Indian Philosophical Congress. As is well-known, the IPC even felt the need to hold a special session (at Almaner in 1950) on whether Aurobindo had refuted māyāvāda by shifting the emphasis from ‘illusion’ (māyā) to ‘play’ (līlā). Opinions seem to have been mixed, but nonetheless they reflect the seriousness accorded to Life Divine even outside Advaita (and neo-Advaita) intellectual circles. Hard to assess to what extent that is still the case today.
Garfield and Bhushan have an informative essay on this topic (‘Bringing Brahman Down to Earth’) that prefaces the papers read at that session of the IPC (by Indra Sen, N.A. Nikam, H Chaudhuri, and G. R. Malkani). Check out their recent anthology on Indian Philosophy in English. Definitely worth a read ( http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199769254.do ).

Nikam’s essay, I think, sums it best: “Between the Māyāvāda of Śaṅkara and the Līlāvāda of the Life Divine, there is a Major Premise which is common to both. Māyāvāda says:
The world is a dream
Dreams are unreal
Therefore, the world is unreal.

The Līlāvāda of Life Divine says:
The world is a dream,
dreams are real.
Therefore, the world is real.”

Nikam takes Aurobindo to have successfully refuted māyāvāda, and offers an interesting outline of the new metaphysical theory:
“(i) In sleep, the waking activities are in abeyance, but the “inner consciousness is not suspended but enters into new inner activities.”
(ii) the whole of this inner activity we do not remember, we remember only what is near the surface.
(iii) near the surface there “an obscurer subconscious element which is a builder” (e.g. “dream-builder”).
(iv) but behind it is the “subliminal” self which is the totality of our inner being and consciousness…”

From this analysis, he concludes (by noting, in passing, the regressive nature of the dream argument) that the meaning of ‘dream’ has changed such that one can now even substitute the Cartesian cogito with something like “I dream, therefore, I exist”!
I’m no scholar of Aurobindo either, but it’s creative appropriations like these that served as a vehicle for modernity in India in the early decades of the last century (with, one may add, varying political consequences).
It’s also appropriations like these that got the likes of Matilal and Daya Krishna to build entire careers arguing that rationalism is the de facto core of Indian philosophy, or D. P. Chattopadhyaya to claim that the only living strand of Indian philosophy is in fact materialism!
The goal these days, of course, is a lot more modest as most everybody grapples with an ever wider range of problems (error theory, disjunctivism, the problem of other minds, arguments against physicalism, critiques of foundationalism, etc.). That’s certainly progress, but it’s not the one I articulate in my initial query.

I, for one, am just as baffled by this notion that the best and perhaps only way to do Indian philosophy is to do exegesis of antique positions in that bhāṣya, vṛtti, vārttika, and ṭīkā vein. Or, worse, use the same antiquated vocabulary and stylistic devices of the original thinkers with more than just a hint of nostalgia for the good old ways before the (ill-fated) advent of modernity. We’re not doing Indian philosophy to promote Hinduism (or Buddhism) but to pursue knowledge and understanding. Or are we? Last time I checked Jay Garfield is not Bob Thurman, and Jonardon Ganeri is not T. M. P. Mahadevan.

Amod Lele on 5 August 2014 at 12:09 pm said:
I remain boggled that anyone can try to take this approach. Far as I can tell, if you remove anything that can be described as “religious concerns” from Indian philosophy, there’s nothing of importance left. Sure, there are some technical debates on epistemology, but first you do interpretive violence to them, and second, it’s hard to see why anyone would care.
Though there are moments when I’m tempted to argue the same about Western philosophy. Once people get hostile to “religion”, hostility to philosophy is usually not far behind.
Once one has arrived at a position, presumably one wishes to defend it, whatever position that is. If one does believe that a Buddhist position is the truest one, then one would be intellectually dishonest to pretend otherwise; to acknowledge one’s belief in such a case is surely not to relinquish one’s title as philosopher. It is pretty clear to me that Daniel Dennett and John Rawls have clearly staked out doctrinal positions that they wish to defend. Are we therefore not to call them philosophers?

Friday, May 30, 2014

Emerson's influence on Nietzsche, Bergson, and James

Casey on May 27, 2014 at 6:11 pm said: 
Its interesting to tie Emerson into the discussion since he had an influence on James, of course, but also a still surprisingly little appreciated influence on Nietzsche. The emphasize on power seems to obviously reflect some of the same language that Emerson liked to use. I think that Emerson is perhaps in fact Nietzsche’s most important influence, not just in something as simple as the ideas that they shared, but in the style of thinking, what Charles Pierce might call the habits of thought that Nietzsche picked up from Emerson.


https://ndpr.nd.edu/.../23751-the-romance-of-individualism-in-emerson-...
Sep 4, 2004 - DAVID MIKICS
The Romance of Individualism in Emerson and Nietzsche Mikics, David, The Romance of Individualism in Emerson and Nietzsche, Ohio University Press, 2003, 263 pp, $49.95 (hbk), ISBN 0821414968.
Reviewed by Steven G. Affeldt , University of Notre Dame
All students of Nietzsche know of his profound admiration for Emerson’s writing. However, as Stanley Cavell has observed, this knowledge has mostly been repressed or ineffective; which is to say that the extent, depth, and specificity of Emerson’s influence upon Nietzsche has remained largely unacknowledged and unassessed. In the course of the past decade or so, owing in large part to the influence of Cavell’s own work on Emerson (and Nietzsche), this situation has begun to change. Emerson’s work has increasingly been taken up philosophically, and students of both Emerson and of Nietzsche have begun to explore systematically the relations between them. While the present study devotes considerably more attention to Nietzsche than to Emerson, it constitutes a provocative and important contribution to this work and enriches our understanding of each of these thinkers. [...]

However, while Emerson and Nietzsche each begin from the bleakest of judgments about the condition in which humans mostly exist (in “The American Scholar” Emerson speaks of humans living as bugs or spawn), their work does not merely condemn nor does it succumb to despair or pessimism. Rather, Mikics argues, their writing is largely devoted to articulating the nature of individuality, exploring why it is mostly not and how it may be achieved, and, through their writing itself, working to enable or provoke that achievement for themselves and others.

Within this shared project, Mikics elaborates many more specific points of contact and traces central aspects of Emerson’s influence on Nietzsche. He warns, however, against too closely assimilating the two. He wishes “to outline a dynamic relation in which Nietzsche struggles with Emerson’s influence and example in order to develop his own path” (p. 2), and he focuses in large part upon articulating what he regards as decisive differences in the ways each understands and seeks the achievement of individuality. His reason for this focus goes beyond the ordinary intellectual scrupulousness that seeks to register differences where they exist, and lies at the heart of the most central and interesting concern of this work.

plato.stanford.edu/entries/emerson/
Jan 3, 2002 - (From Amos Bronson Alcott, Ralph Waldo Emerson: An Estimate of His Emerson's works were well known throughout the United States and Europe in his day. Nietzsche read German translations of Emerson's essays, copied passages from “History” and “Self-Reliance” in his journals, and wrote of the Essays: that he had never “felt so much at home in a book.” Emerson's ideas about “strong, overflowing” heroes, friendship as a battle, education, and relinquishing control in order to gain it, can be traced in Nietzsche's writings. Other Emersonian ideas-about transition, the ideal in the commonplace, and the power of human will permeate the writings of such classical American pragmatists as William James and John Dewey. [...]

Cavell's engagement with perfectionism springs from a response to his colleague John Rawls, who in A Theory of Justice condemns Nietzsche (and implicitly Emerson) for his statement that “mankind must work continually to produce individual great human beings.” “Perfectionism,” 

www.amazon.com › ... › Philosophy › Movements
The great American thinker Ralph Waldo Emerson and the influential German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, though writing in different eras and ultimately ...

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=uC4NAQAAMAAJ
George J. Stack - 1992 - ‎Snippet view - ‎More editionsGeorge J. Stack traces the sources of ideas and theories that have long been considered the exclusive province of Friedrich Nietzsche to the surprisingly radical writings of the American essayist and poet, Ralph Waldo Emerson.

https://books.google.co.in/books?isbn=1107120268
Jeffrey Church - 2015 - ‎Preview - ‎More editionsBy contrast, in my view, Nietzsche offers the lives of exemplary individuals as the truth about the good life and hence the ... Emerson, Nietzsche speaks of such individuals as “representative men” (Repräsentanten), as expressing the “image of ...

https://books.google.co.in/books?isbn=1783740973
Jean McClure Mudge - 2015 - ‎Full view - ‎More editionsJean McClure Mudge. defeat in World War I, a successful German book mythologized Nietzsche as a pivotal Germanic-Nordic-Greek myth-creator for the German people.73 The next year, a booklet interpreted him as “Prophet” of an extreme, ...


Here are some recommendations of books to read that in some way or other challenge materialism. This is from Dr. Larry Dossey. Among his recommendations, I would particularly cite 
Smith’s “Beyond the Postmodern Mind”, 
Radin’s “Conscious Universe”, 
van Lommel’s “Consciousness Beyond Life”, 
Carter’s “Parapsychology and the Skeptics”, and 
Tart’s “The End of Materialism.” 
Perhaps the best of all – though a challenging read, heavily researched – is Kelley’s "Irreducible Mind.”

https://books.google.co.in/books?isbn=1442232404
Edward F. Kelly, ‎Adam Crabtree, ‎Paul Marshall - 2015 - ‎Preview - ‎More editionsPhysicalism versus quantum mechanics. In Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (3rd ed., pp. 245–260). Berlin: Springer.

...
The Emersonian Background of the Bergson-James Controversy
Anna M. Nieddu

13 I refer to the varieties of Emersonian suggestions that, also in Europe, spread out thanks to an exceptionally fast circulation of all the most important works by Emerson, and of Representative Men in particular. This almost immediate circulation is largely owed to the attendant success of Th. Carlyle’s works of 1841, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History, and to the novelty represented by the disagreement expressed nine years later by Emerson in his Representative Men. In this book, the greatness of man is depicted like a potentiality extended to all human beings and every ‘immediate’ theodicy, that foresee some person mysteriously elected by God, is denied. Emerson’s thought on this topic restores the possibility of an ethical approach to the problem of the ‘greatness of men’; an approach that can be found in Bergson as well as in James. In this paper, cross-references to Emerson’s works come from: R. W. Emerson, The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Centenary Edition, ed. by E. W. Emerson, 12 vols. Houghton Mifflin, Boston and New York, 1903-04.

19 The theme of “character” countersigns the reception of Emerson by Nietzsche too. The problem of the relationship Nietzsche-Emerson has almost crossed one century of the historiographical-philosophical search, considerably modifying some relevant interpretative parameters. An exhaustive outcome of this search is given by the book of an Italian scholar; B. Zavatta, La sfida del carattere. Nietzsche lettore di Emerson, Roma, 2004.
...

Sunday, May 11, 2014

Pots don't speak how monks live

justinon 10 May 2014 at 3:54 pm said: Thanks for this, Lyone, and my apologies for the late response. My worry with this approach: “The first few centuries of every religious tradition is pretty much the same in this regard: lacking in solid historic data” is that there are sometimes vastly different amounts of solid historical data among religions. So I couldn’t say “All we have is myth, legend, hagiography.” We do have those, but we also have archaeology, historians such as Josephus, linguistic analysis, etc. So I think we can and should do our best to separate out what is strictly claimed within the tradition (especially when the claims just appear much later in the tradition) and ideas and events which can be attested to from multiple sources.

justinon 10 May 2014 at 4:51 pm said: Dear Jayarava – many thanks for all of this. It’s a bit overwhelming in terms of what to try to respond do…
First, I’m not sure claims about “what the Buddha thought” aren’t a priori refutable. The body of texts we have can be used to argue for different interpretations and new texts may still be found to upset the whole thing. As you later stated, Gombrich is definitely a Popperian, so the (also later) point about “what counts as evidence” is really the key problem here. And as you also note, aside from Schopen’s possible contrarianism, the main arguments for distrusting texts come from Postmodernism.
Next, “Schopen in particular has pointed out that were we do have archaeological evidence it contradicts textual evidence –particularly with respect to how monks live and conducted themselves.” I think it’s fairer to say that *some* archaeological evidence contradicts textual evidence, and/or gives us new information. I think we have to be much more circumspect on what evidence Schopen presents and what conclusions he draws from it.
Schopen and others may have upped the game, so to speak, but I hope that in the process they have not also discouraged many great minds from looking at texts and thinking hard about what they mean and meant to Buddhists, past and present.

Tweets @blog_supplement
It is not about whether SSVC had an IndoAryan component or sarasvatI river or date of RV: These are separate even if related problems. Linguistic & philological evidence are superior to archaeological evidence as the latter is way more incomplete & pots don't speak
The core RV & older sections of ancestral AV shows signs of a mobile mixed pastoralist/agricultural society with evidence familiarity with regions closer to the Caspian sea & more northern latitudes than bhArata. The philological+linguistic evidence combined with genetics suggests that IA invasion was not likely product of elite dominance: it was a movement of a sizable population of IA speakers; thus genetic evidence supports not negates AIT hypothesis unlike what is spouted by those unfamiliar with such data in its original form.
Given the population movement & fact that IE appearance in Europe was comparable where autochthons likely overwhelmed, there's nothing wrong calling it an invasion: unlikely that it involved no military aspect at all, especially given that Indoaryans were a mobile warlike people
Willingness of certain Hs to kid themselves without grasp of primary data about autochthonism of original IA is a reflection of a certain intellectual cretinism stemming from the inability to transcend emotionalism while approaching a problem; this could come to bite them in more life-and-death and immediate geo-political issues than the origin of their long dead ancestors

Thursday, March 20, 2014

‘Tradition’ has moved towards less esoteric, intellectual fields

Neevel’s suggestion is that the life-spans of probably already long lives have been prolonged in order to make sure that every important teacher had met the previous one (Nathamuni-Yamuna-Ramanuja…). The life span of Nathamuni has been extended to 300 years in order to put him in touch with the Alvars. It was the way a tradition made its strong belief in their connection into history.

Daniele Cuneo on 19 March 2014 at 11:12 am said:
Hi Elisa, as you might imagine, along lines similar to those you have drawn, I would think of the theoretical developments within Pratyabhijñā (Kaśmīr Śaivism, Trika, paramādvaita or whatever we should call it). Probably very much influenced by Torella’s writings, my take would be that the ‘tradition’ has moved towards a progressive opening up with respect to different, and less esoteric, intellectual fields, social strata, scriptures and the like. Very briefly, and without checking references and stuff, from the world of Somānanda quite close to not only śaiva scripture and crowded with many enemies (famously, Bhartṛhari and the grammarians) and few allies, we move to the much more open intellectual universe of Utpaladeva (in which—for instance—Bhartṛhati has become a powerful ally), carefully constructed in order to debate with all the philosophical schools, in the open, so to say, practically outside the esoteric, only-Tantric circles; then Abhinavagupta systematizes even more the theoretical and scriptural grounds of it all, by coordinating—for instance—the various Tantric strands (Krama, Kaula, etc.) and by further incorporating the dualistic schools in the system; with Kṣemarāja, it seems to me, we witness a further moment of intellectual colonization, with the full inclusion of the Spanda-side of Tantric speculations and the appropriation of dualistic tantras (like the Netra or the Svacchanda) by means of clever commentaries that reinterpret them in a nondualistic framework. So, my general feeling would be that in the span from Yāmuna to Veṅkathanātha something similar was happening, with the gradual conquest of intellectual and social fields to the cause of the new edifice of Viśiṣṭādvaita. But it is just my feeling, very much imbued with my assumption on the social and cultural workings of making philosophy…

Thank you, Daniele. This is also my take on it. I even suggested that the sequence Yāmuna–Rāmānuja–Veṅkaṭanātha resembles the Somānanda–Utpaladeva–Abhinavagupta one (here:

Matthew, thanks for this. I will need more time to assess the value of the book (and will possibly write about it) —which, mea culpa, I did not know. By and large, however, it can be said that the book has a clear thesis (the continuity of the lineage from the Āḻvārs through Yāmuna to Rāmānuja) and that it develops it in an interesting way. Nothing can be said against the solid preparation of its author, although he might be slightly inclined to read the history of Viśiṣṭādvaita ante litteram through the lenses of what came out of it (e.g., by detecting in causal remarks in Yāmuna the seed of later developments). I am, for instance, not in the position to assess the authenticity of the Tamil’s comments embedded in the Divya Prabandham and attributed to Yāmuna, but it strikes me that Narasimhachary does not even address the issue. What do you think?

Sri Krishna Prem on science - This is a letter by Sri Krishnaprem, the unique case of a British professor who became an Indian yogi and eventually a Guru in his own right. He had his as...
I first read this in 1977. Now, 37 years later, I still find it one of the most inspired comments on the limits of modern science. As much as I admire Alan Wallace, whom I consider to be one of the greatest exponents of contemplative science in the world today, I’ve never seen anything in his writings that captures the whole picture as beautifully and as simply as this passage.
I think part of it is that not only was Ronald Nixon (his name before he took sannyas) a brilliant intellectual, but he had a spontaneity of devotion rare among westerners (rare for anybody, I suppose).

There’s a great story about his going to the Mother (of the Sri Aurobindo Ashram) for darshan. When he got to her, She said, “What do you want?” He replied, “To give myself.’
The Mother was known for having the capacity to look into the depths of one’s soul. She looked at Krishna Prem for an unusually long time, and said, “But you have given yourself.”
Without any hesitation, he quietly and sincerely replied, “Not enough.” The Mother later said that those two words impressed Her very deeply.

Friday, March 14, 2014

Maybe we need to ditch the label of “philosophy” altogether

Chris Framarin on 13 March 2014 at 4:19 pm said: Hi Shyam,
I think we should be more open to the possibility that the Yogasūtra (and other seminal Hindu texts) attribute direct moral standing to entities in virtue of their capacity for pleasure and pain (among other reasons). Your argument against this view reads:

One standard account that we find from Hedonic Utilitarians like Peter Singer and Bentham is the idea that someone counts, ethically, if they can suffer (Singer 2012). Animals count because they can suffer. I like the hedonic account, but it has problems. On this account, if I overcome suffering, I would no longer be in the category of things who should be taken seriously. This disincentivises me from overcoming suffering. That’s strange.

Ethan Mills on 14 March 2014 at 5:52 am said:
It seems to me that freedom vs. determinism wasn’t a major issue in the Indian tradition because almost everyone was a compatibilist (or soft determinist). Karma and rebirth simply wouldn’t work without determinism: the whole idea that certain actions inevitably lead to certain consequences seems like some kind of determinism. But it need not be hard determinism, the theory that determinism rules out freedom. A decision to follow the path of a specific school can be free in the sense of being caused by the right sort of desire or mental state, but one need not claim that such a choice must itself be solely caused by an agent (as in libertarian agent causation theories). Compare this with the sort of compatibilism advocated by Hume and Mill.

Now, I’m not saying that any classical Indian philosophers explicitly advocated compatibilism. They didn’t have to. In a tradition driven so heavily by disagreement, there was simply no reason to argue about an issue that almost everyone agreed about. I suspect this has been such a big issue in Western thought because of the religious background: if you can be damned for all eternity for your choices, they damn well better be fully yours. But with karma and rebirth, you simply need to be in a position where you can follow a path to liberation at some point. If it doesn’t happen now, you’ll have plenty more chances in future lifetimes.

andrew ollett on 8 March 2014 at 5:03 pm said:
there is clearly a lot to disagree with here, especially regarding the narrow construal of “philosophy,” which clearly reflects an enlightenment-era ideal of “reasoning without tradition” that is not only western, but even excludes an enormous amount of what had previously counted as philosophy in the west. i will limit my dissent to an obvious point: there may be “theology” and “philosophy” (maybe), but there are not “theologians” and “philosophers.” this is one instance of the myth of the schools, according to which everyone who ever wrote in india was a card-carrying member of one and only one philosophical (or should i say theological?) school. is kumārila incapable of philosophical thought because his primary output was commentaries on a system of scriptural interpretation? instead of kicking every important indian thinker (except for the later naiyāyikas, i guess) out of “philosophy,” we need to change our idea of what “philosophy” is. or maybe we need to ditch the label of “philosophy” altogether, constricting and judgmental as it is, and focus on the history of indian intellectual traditions.