Savitri Era of those who adore, Om Sri Aurobindo and The Mother.

Friday, July 03, 2015

Wilber changed his heroes several times

In my opinion, The Atman Project is Ken Wilber's best work, even though it is one of his earliest works. Ken did his homework with volumes of cross-cultural research, and came up with some astounding results in terms of how the individual human develops.

This review is from: Up from Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution
Wilber seems to have changed his main philosophical heroes several times - in "Up from Eden" it's Hegel, in SES it's Plotinus and Schelling, and in both SES and the post-metaphysical works it's Jürgen Habermas (!). On this point, SES seems more logical than "Up from Eden", but its nevertheless fascinating how Wilber uses Hegel to bolster his spiritual case. My guess is that he was deeply moved by Copleston's description of Hegel's philosophy in "History of Philosophy". So was I. Copleston somehow manages to make Hegel sound interesting, relevant and even somewhat spiritual. More problematic are Wilber's references to Da Free John (Adi Da Samraj), the leader of a Tantric sex cult in California, with which Wilber had some kind of association at the time of writing this book.

At the start, Wilber had only a single idea – whether it was the increasingly fragmenting "spectrum of consciousness" of "Wilber I", or the psychological and transpersonal arc and linear evolution of "Wilber II" . While Wilber has totally rejected the former, I find that both of these worldviews are very good, and while neither should be taken literally, either can equally serve as a myth or allegorical story of some aspect or another of Consciousness. In fact, I would say that this very early work was without doubt Wilber's best.

But then Wilber added more and more ideas with each successive iteration of his philosophy. "Wilber II"'s The Atman Project incorporated the Seven Stages of Life from Da Free John, developmental psychology (e.g. Freud, Piaget, etc), and (in Up From Eden) Jean Gebser's concept of history; Wilber III added on Howard Gardner's lines of development to the simple linear pre-trans of II; IV added on quadrants, Truth Claims, and the big Three of Habermas, holons and the holarchy from Koestler, deconstruction from postmodernism, and then later, Spiral Dynamics, and now the nascent Wilber-V has eight perspectives in addition to four quadrants and everything else.[73] Yet with all this increasingly complexity there is no increasing harmony. If anything, the whole system is becoming more unwieldy; for example eight perspectives seems a definite step down from the mandalic elegance of the four quadrants.

However, because Wilber writes so broadly about other thinkers, and his books sell so well, people get the idea that his own intellectual annotations, side-notes, and blind spots really refer to the actual teacher or teaching that he is referring to. This is certainly not the case regarding his interpretation of Sri Aurobindo (see sect. 3-i), and there is a similar pattern of misinterpretation in the way he approaches Plotinus, including in this case, as D. H. Frew points out, deliberate misquoting.[76] Even his tables comparing Plotinus and Aurobindo have a contrived feel about them. Not surprisingly, Wilber also gets Shankara wrong.[77] And while Wilber very often refers to Gebser, as William Irwin Thompson points out[78], there is very little of Gebser in Wilber's work.
David Lane has pointed out that Wilber makes a huge assumption regarding Shabd Yoga.[79] Jeff Meyerhoff has pointed out numerous, across the board flaws in Wilber's thinking and his research claims.[80] And Robert Carroll, Geoff Falk, myself, and Jim Chamberlain have all shown that Wilber, in critiquing Evolutionary science, doesn't even seem to understand what Darwinism really teaches.[81] It seems that everywhere we look, Wilber imposes his own ideas onto the books that he cites. As a result he is not able to put aside his own personal worldview to hear a different, even contrary, one.

by Amod Lele on May.06, 2012
I’ve recently been writing an article on Ken Wilber’s thought, and have come to realize just how much his ideas have changed over the past ten years. His readers, and increasingly he himself, have come to characterize this as a change from a fourth phase of his thought (“Wilber-4″) to a fifth phase (“Wilber-5″). The changes can be hard to spot because the new view is detailed in only one book (Integral Spirituality); the rest of it is found online, in excerpts from a long forthcoming volume. What is most striking in the change from Wilber-4 to Wilber-5 is its post/modernism. Wilber has moved much closer to a postmodern view in which there are only perspectives, which bring worlds into existence rather than discovering them; he has also become more modernist, giving much more prominence to an idea of cultural evolution where the modern age supersedes those that came before.
But as David Harvey has noted, the continuities between modernism and postmodernism can be more significant than their self-proclaimed differences. (In this discussion I will repeatedly use the term “post/modern”, to emphasize the important respects in which the two are the same.) In this case, premoderntraditions play an ever smaller role. Wilber’s earlier thought, in looking at the traditions of the premodern world, had tended to incorporate only mystical experience, but mystical experience still got the trump card – it was able to tell us what ultimate reality is. In Wilber-5, mystical experience needs to be kept in its place, without any sovereignty over other kinds of knowledge. Where Wilber’s earlier thought was all about the relationship between Ascent and Descent, Ascent now takes a smaller role as only one or two perspectives out of many, the rest being Descending and post/modern. Read the whole article. Posted by William Harryman at Thursday, May 10, 2012 

Amod Lele on 23 January 2014 at 9:28 pm said: That’s fair, Patrick. 
I suspect my tone in the comment to Matthew above was too dismissive. I suppose part of it comes out of an article I published last year on Ken Wilber, whose own perennialism is very much like that of the Theosophists and leads him to gross misinterpretations of the traditions he studies – but I say that while being in very close sympathy with the overall aims of Wilber’s project.
Amod Lele on 23 January 2014 at 9:49 pm said: I agree with you that “those who are skilled or expert in a domain of knowledge or inquiry do in fact have a greater qualification in that regard than do other people.” I used “élitist” with respect to the Theosophists’ belief that they were the skilled experts on each tradition out there, as opposed to others well versed in any given tradition who’d spent far longer with it than the Theosophists themselves had. I suspect this may have reflected at least some amount of class prejudice.
It’s fair to say, though, that this kind of attitude is shared by a number of indigenous Indian traditions (especially Advaitins) and by many contemporary social-scientific scholars of religion – not least those who are determinedly anti-perennialist and anti-theosophical. (The common approach that even your fellow scholars, let alone everyday practitioners, are nothing more than “data”.)

The Perennial Quest for a Psychology with a Soul: An Inquiry ... Joseph Vrinte - 2002 - ‎Preview - regarding the nature of human consciousness. Ken Wilber's spectrum psychology does not try to describe the complete spectrum of human experience within one psychological system. He creates an interpretation of human consciousness ...

Saturday, June 27, 2015

Great Separation: Mark Lilla and Leela Gandhi

Justice: Rights and Wrongs by Nicholas Wolterstorff (May 2, 2010) by Nicholas Wolterstorff
He traces our intuitions about rights and justice back even further, to Hebrew and Christian scriptures. After extensively discussing justice in the Old Testament and the New, he goes on to show why ancient Greek and Roman philosophy could not serve as a framework for a theory of rights.
Connecting rights and wrongs to God's relationship with humankind, Justice not only offers a rich and compelling philosophical account of justice, but also makes an important contribution to overcoming the present-day divide between religious discourse and human rights. Justice: Rights and Wrongs

Nicholas Wolterstorff - 2010 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions Not only does this book reflect the clarity and acuity of thought that characterize Wolterstorff's work, it also reflects the humane sensibilities of someone who has thought and felt deeply about these matters for a long time
May 29th, 2015

Christian human rights—An introduction

posted by 
Christmas Day, 1942. The outcome of World War II was undecided, but the pope had something new to say.
A month before, the tide at Stalingrad had turned against the Germans. Just two days before, General Erich von Manstein had abandoned his efforts to relieve the Wehrmacht’s doomed Sixth Army. But there was no telling that the extraordinary German strength in the war so far would now ebb quickly.
The Americans had formally entered the war a year before, but the Allies would not reach mainland Italy for another nine months, or make it to Rome for a year and a half. The pope—Eugenio Pacelli, or Pius XII—was in dire straits. His relationship with Benito Mussolini had long since soured, and he was a prisoner in his own tiny Roman domain.
As for the Jews, the worst victims of the conflict, millions were dead already; the victims at Babi Yar had lain in their ravine for more than a year; Treblinka, the most infernal death camp, had come on line six months before and already completed much of its grim work.
Officially, of course, the Catholic Church and its leader were neutral, and didn’t play politics. Many of his flock were to be found on both sides of the war.
May 29th, 2015

Personalism, Community, and the Origins of Human Rights

posted by 
In the summer of 1947, the Institute for International Law reconvened after a ten-year hiatus.

MINDING THE MODERN - In his book MINDING THE MODERN, Thomas Pfau argues that the loss of foundational concepts in classical and medieval Aristotelian philosophy caused a fateful separation between reason and will in European thought

After outlining the political implications of the three different conceptions of divine-human relations, Lilla begins with Hobbes, too, and the "Great Separation" between God and earthly authority that his thinking inspired. Humans being by nature disputatious, barely had desacralized politics got off the ground than the Romantic philosophers Rousseau and Kant argued to bring God back to ground statecraft ethically. 

Europeans and Americans tend to hold the opinion that democracy is a uniquely Western inheritance, but in The Common Cause, Leela Gandhi recovers stories of an alternate version, describing a transnational history of democracy in the first ...

Thursday, June 25, 2015

Stoicism is not able to bring about the total equality of soul

Savitri Era of those who adore, Om Sri Aurobindo & The Mother.

Saturday, June 06, 2015

Universe already existed prior to any possibility of being observed, interpreted, or evaluated

Speculative Realism – a primer - by Steven Shaviro

Kant denounced speculation because it overstepped the bounds of all possible knowledge. For today’s new speculative thinkers, in contrast, speculation is necessary precisely because of the limits of knowledge. There is so much that is real, but that we cannot ever possibly know. Twenty-first-century speculation begins where our solid knowledge ends. Far from making dogmatic claims, this new form of speculation paradoxically explores the space of the ungraspable, and the time of the unpredictable.
Speculative Realism insists upon the independence of the world, and of things in the world, from our own conceptualizations of them. It rejects the Kantian thesis that the order of the world depends upon the way that our minds (or our languages, or our cultures) work to structure it. And it also rejects the phenomenological assumption of a primordial reciprocity or correspondence between self and world, or subject and object, or knower and known. Reality is far weirder than we are able to imagine. Things never conform to the ideas that we have about them; there is always something more to them than what we are able to grasp. The world does not fit into our own cognitive paradigms and narrative modes of explanation. “Man” is not the measure of all things. This is why speculation is necessary. We must speculate, to escape from our inveterate anthropocentrism and take seriously the existence of a fundamentally alien, nonhuman world.
There is not one predetermined form of speculation. It’s a voyage into the unknown, without any assurance of a proper ending. In this regard, one can contrast philosophical speculation, which is open-ended, with financial speculation, which is always done with the aim of ultimately turning a profit.
Financial speculation is thus a way to manage and control the future. It rests on the unquestioned assumption that the future will be commensurate with the present. In contrast, metaphysical speculation confronts, not risk, but irreducible uncertainty. This distinction was first made by the great economist John Maynard Keynes.

Whatever the case may be in economics, however, philosophical speculation is entirely a matter of basic uncertainty, rather than manageable risk. There is no formula to guide the process of such speculation. Each of the speculative realist thinkers proposes a different way to speculate about the world, as it exists unknowably apart from us.

Rationality is terrifyingly inhuman. Physical science allows us to conceptualize a world that is not in any sense made to our measure. But the scientific project can never be complete or final, as the world is ultimately non-conceptual and unconceptualizable. Our ideas of things can never match up to the things themselves. For Kant, this meant that we were relegated to – but also safely grounded within – the realm of phenomena, or mere appearances.

In other words, the correlation between mind and world established by Kant is itself contingent, rather than necessary. And from this insight, Meillassoux further deduces that radical contingency is the one and only universal necessity. It is absolutely necessary, he says, that the world has the capacity to be other than it currently is. Things can happen for no reason whatsoever. Even socalled “laws of nature” may arbitrarily change or disappear. 

We cannot grasp objects cognitively; but we can allude to objects through metaphor and other aesthetic practices. In this way we can cherish things, even though we do not fully understand them. And such is the route of speculation: “the real is something that cannot be known, only loved.”

Speculation is necessary, for all these thinkers, because it is the only way in which we can seek to trace the forces, powers, and events that generate our bodies and minds, but that remain forever beyond our minds’ and bodies’ grasp.
In sum, the speculative realists all find ways to circumvent Kant’s prohibition of metaphysical speculation. They work to resist the anthropocentrism that results from Kant’s privileging of epistemology over ontology. For Meillassoux and for Brassier, the way to overcome the constraints of Kantian epistemology is to realize that the limitations upon possible knowledge discovered by Kant are not inscribed within our own cognitive faculties, so much as they are already features of things in themselves, which are irreducibly contingent (Meillassoux) or non-conceptual (Brassier). For Harman and for Grant, meanwhile, the privilege accorded to human cognition must itself be put into question. Human perception and understanding are less special than we generally believe; for they belong to a much broader spectrum of processes of relation and causal influence. 
Epistemology cannot be given priority, because understanding and knowing are themselves caught up within larger movements for which they cannot themselves account. All these thinkers take up speculation, not as a way to discover higher “dogmatic” truths, but rather as a way to explore what Meillassoux calls the “Great Outdoors” of existence, a realm far too vast and weird, and radically uncertain, to be subsumed by our own values and norms.
Steven Shaviro is the DeRoy Professor of English at Wayne State University. He writes about process philosophy, film and music video, and science fiction. He blogs at The Pinocchio Theory.

I don’t think that Whitehead is being anthropomorphic at all: rather, he is inverting the direction of anthropomorphic projections. For Whitehead, human feelings are in fact the exemplification, within our own experience, of a broader kind of process that is far more widely distributed among entities in the world. I cannot remember who first said this, but Whitehead’s actual procedure is – far from attributing human qualities to other organisms –to try to find more general processes, of which the human version that we are familiar with is just one, not necessarily privileged, example. Whitehead’s procedure is actually what Charles Sanders Peirce calls abduction.

Nonetheless, even with all these explanations, Whitehead’s use of feeling as a mere techincal term remains a bit counter-intuitive. He shores up his position by appealing to a number of philosophical precedents . He says that "this use of the term ‘feeling’ has a close analogy to Alexander’s use of the term ‘enjoyment'; and has also some kinship with Bergson’s use of the term ‘intuition.’ (Just as an aside, I wonder whether it might be a good idea to go back and look at Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity: I have never read it, but Whitehead clearly thinks highly of it, and Deleuze mentions it in passing as a great book).

In any case, Whitehead also – and more surprisingly than with his citations of Alexander and Bergson – closely associates his use of the word feeling with Descartes’ use of the equivalent Latin term sentire. Didier Debaise discusses this connection in his new book L’appât des possibles.  posted on Monday, June 8th, 2015

Feelings as Experiences There is no law that a feeling cannot be an experience; experiences are of all kinds and take all forms […] The post Feelings as Experiences appeared fir...

Friday, May 15, 2015

Ram Mohan was doing something different

The second half of Skholiast‘s interview with Amod Lele
Unquestioning acceptance of received wisdom is not philosophy, though faith-seeking-understanding is. I’m not enough of an anthropologist to say whether this is a human universal, but I suspect not, in that challenging received wisdom can be something of a luxury; when it’s a real question whether you can feed your family, you’ll probably just think what you’re supposed to think, and that’s as much wisdom as you need. 
I find myself quite unimpressed by ideas like “conceptual colonialism” – even when applied to India, but far more so for China and Japan, which were not actually colonized. I’ve long been troubled by the prevalence of, for lack of a better word, white guilt: that is, in this context, the idea that a history of racism and colonialism means that the West and its categories should be assumed wrong, as if racism and colonialism were not things other cultures indulged in when they had the chance. “Philosophy” is of course not a word native to Asia, but neither is any other word in the English language. Translation is always a tricky business, but I think the word “philosophy” in this sense does a fine job of capturing what Rāmānuja and Xunzi and Dōgen are doing. [...]

In some ways my way of really engaging with something is to react against it. And I do find truth often emerges from conflict. That’s another theme I see coming up here, in the questions about Buddhist sectarianism and Ayn Rand: the differences between traditions can be productive in our attempts to find truth. I’ve been talking a lot with another friend who finds my ideas on hermeneutics a little weird, specifically the idea that one reads texts most productively by letting them challenge oneself (he even calls that the “Lele Doctrine”). But that’s certainly been what I’ve found: we need ideas sufficiently different from our own that they shock us enough to react against them (though not so different that we can’t even imagine what their truth would mean). In my experience at least, I’d say that’s how we really learn, that’s how we grow. [...]

And conversely: the scholarship on Asian religions and Asian philosophy for the past thirty, forty years, has increasingly become this mind-numbingly dull drumbeat of a critique of everybody who’s talked about the subject before, of people like Ram Mohan Roy, Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan: saying “Ha, ha, look at these stupid people and how wrong they all got it. Aren’t we so great because we’re so much smarter, and we know the tradition really wasn’t that way?” And yet, the thing about that line of critique is that there’s very rarely any sort of constructive alternative advanced—

S: It doesn’t tell us what they tradition was, just what it wasn’t.

A.L.: Well, they do kind of try to tell us what the tradition was; but what they don’t try to tell us is what the tradition could be. What Roy and Vivekananda, and Walpola Rahula, and Olcott, and [Anagarika] Dharmapala, and all of those people who get taken as whipping-boys today – what they were trying to do was re-invigorate their traditions, and provide them with the resources to be constructive contributors to the dialogue of the world. I read all this stuff from Don Lopez, and all these other people from the past forty years, as basically saying “shut up, go back in your hole, you can’t do that, the real tradition was what was there in 1500” – in a way that closes off that dialogue. It tries to portray these people, people like Vivekananda, as orientalists who had no respect for their tradition. But it seems to me that it’s people like Lopez who have a much deeper disrespect for the tradition, in that they want to pose this radical disjuncture, where the tradition is somehow not allowed to change and update itself.
I think what was really going on – well, the problem with Vivekananda and so on was that they didn’t really have enough of a historical awareness, they weren’t quite willing to admit that they were doing something new. But I think that where we need to go now is a willingness to do something new. Nobody now, or at least, very few people now, and certainly not scholars of Buddhism like Lopez, will ever tell you that Chinese Buddhism is illegitimate because it made all these incredible modifications to Indian Buddhism, to the point that it was completely unrecognizable compared to what the historical Buddha would have taught – even though it did all that. There are many ways in which the gap between Pali Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism is much larger than the gap between Pali Buddhism and the Buddhism of an Olcott or a Dharmapala. They’ll never say that Chinese Buddhism is illegitimate, but they’re so ready to dump on, you know, modern hippie Buddhism, and say, well, that’s illegitimate. Even when it differs less. So part of that philosophical task, of constructive dialogue now, is accepting that some sort of modification of a tradition is a legitimate part of that tradition. While giving the respect that we want to give to the ancients, we should be ready to accept some amount of modification, change, perhaps even modernization, and reasoned differentiation.
And I’m seeing some encouraging signs, in books like Andrew Nicholson’s Unifying Hinduism, and David McMahan’s Making of Buddhist Modernism, where people are saying, for instance: “Yes, what Ram Mohan was doing was something different from what came before him, but he also wasn’t just making it up. He was reading quite widely and thoroughly, he was engaged in the debates of his time, and cognizant of the debates going on in this world that really wasn’t influenced by the British. He was bringing them into this British environment, and made of them something different by doing so, but something that still had a connection to the tradition that came before it.” (The first half of this interview is here) [I am a Buddhist]

Critical Reflections on the Humanities and Social Sciences Posted by larvalsubjects [6] Comments
This article by Clive Hamilton, I think, marks what is at stake in the New Materialisms and some of the Speculative Realisms. The issue is not some hackneyed attempt to champion the sciences and objectivity over meaning, but to draw attention to the material dimensions of how we dwell and live. Today, more than ever, we need to reflect on whether the tools of deconstruction, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, Marxist critical theory, and semiotics are adequate to thinking the world we dwell in and how these theoretical orientations might erase the fundamental materiality of existence. This erasure is so thorough that it’s difficult to even discern when working within these theoretical frames for, after all, one can only see what one can see, and being is here reduced to meaning. This critical reflection is not undertaken to erase these methodologies– quite the contrary –but to mark their limits, note their blindspots, and develop a theoretical frame capable of both preserving what is vital in these forms of thought and of moving beyond those limitations. This is what is at stake in the critique of correlationism. Materiality is not phenomenality, a lived experience, a meaning, nor a text – though it can affect all of these things – but something with its own dynamics and forms of power. We need a form of theory capable of thinking that and that avoids the urge to treat everything as texts, meanings, and correlates of intentions.

Wednesday, February 11, 2015

Sri Aurobindo maps out the structure of the universe

Context, Culture and Worship: The Quest for "Indian-ness" - Page 50
The other instance of an appeal for a religion-less age comes from Sri Aurobindo.... 47 See, S.K. Maitra, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1941, 1965. appeal made by Bonhoeffer and ...

The Sacred Universe: Earth, Spirituality, and Religion in ... - Page 15
Thomas Berry, ‎Mary Evelyn Tucker - 2009 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
The first is Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950), intellectually one of the most creative of the spiritual personalities of modern ... at Cambridge, where he came under the influence of Henri Berg- son (1859-1941) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844- 1900).

The Hindu Tradition: Readings in Oriental Thought - Page 326
Ainslie T. Embree, ‎William Theodore de Bary - 2011 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
... while the other two, Mohandas Gandhi and Aurobindo Chose, lived lives that at points contradicted normal patterns of both Indian and Western experience. Rabindrandth Tagore (1861-1941) was the son of Debendranath Tagore, who had ...

Living Your Divine Life: Experience God's Glory, Absolute ...
Orest Bedrij - 2009 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
Srinivasa, K. R. Sri Aurobindo: A Biography and a History. 2 vols. Pondicherry India, 1980. Stein, Edith. Finite and Eternal ... London: Oxford University Press, lnc., 1941 Tatia, Nathmal. Studies in Jaina Philosophy. Banares, India: Jaina Culture  ...

The Subtle Body: The Story of Yoga in America - Page 157
she wrote to Elsie in 1941. “I can only say that I have faith that because I aspire to reach the Highest I shall one day do so and that I have,” in Aurobindo and the Mother, “the MARGARET WOODROW WILSON “TURNS HINDU” 157.

The Democratic Predicament: Cultural Diversity in Europe and ...
Jyotirmaya Tripathy, ‎Sudarsan Padmanabhan - 2014 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
Sri Aurobindo, Human Cycles, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1962. Strydom, Piet ... The Mahatma and the Poet: Letters and Debates Between Gandhi and Tagore 1915–1941, New Delhi: National Book Trust, 1997a [1928]. ———, 'The  ...

Indian Writing in English - Page 202
Ed. Mohit K. Ray - 2003 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
In their vast spiritual journeys, Sri Aurobindo maps out his version of the structure of the universe and its meaning. ... Rabindranath Tagore Tagore (1861-1941) is one of the Finest products of Indian renaissance, who comes closest to Sri  ...

Studying Hinduism: Key Concepts and Methods - Page 276
Sushil Mittal, ‎Gene Thursby - 2009 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
Aurobindo, Sri [Aurobindo Ghose]. 1997. Karmayogin: Political Writings and Speeches 1909–1910. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Aurobindo, Sri [Aurobindo Ghose]. ... 1941–42 (1348 Bengali era) [1888].Dharmatattva. Calcutta: Bangiya  ...

The Persistence of Religion: An Essay on Tantrism and Sri ... - Page 132
Kees W. Bolle - 1971 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
Zurich: Rascher, 1941. Kapali Sastry, T.V., Further Lights: The Veda and the Tantra. Pondicherry: Ashram, 1951. — — , Lights on the Ancients. Madras: SriAurobindo Library, 1954. Keith, A. B., The Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and  ...

100 Significant Pre-Independence Speeches
H. D. Sharma - 2012 - ‎Preview
The Ashram grew around Aurobindo and he found enough time to meditate, do yoga, think deeply and write. ... Whenfreedom cameon the 15August 1941(it happened tobe Aurobindo's seventy fifth birthday) he was requested by the All India  ...

Space-Time Continuum - Page 119
As the above poem shows, the point in infinities of Aurobindo is not a stable one, but rather a vibrant one, infused with the vitality to ... Quoted by F. O. Mattheissen, American Renaissance (1941; London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.

Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle ... - Page 120
Leela Gandhi - 2006 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
As late as 1941, frustrated by his sense of the mishandling by Congress officials of the "Cripps Proposals," which offered dominion status to India in exchange for the promise of unequivocal commitment to the allied war effort, Sri Aurobindo  ...

Structural Depths of Indian Thought: - Page 545
P. T. Raju - 1985 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
Aurobindo is acquainted with the evolutionist philosophies of the West, but is dissatisfied with them, for they cannot explain why ... Rabindranath Tagore Tagore (1861-1941) is not an academical philosopher, although trained in philosophy,  ...

The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy - Page 179
Jay L. Garfield, ‎William Edelglass - 2011 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
Aurobindo's The Renaissance in India (1918) is a classic from this period. He sees the Indian ... Two cultural icons, nonacademic philosophers with pan-Indian and 

New Educational Philosophy - Page 205
The Mother joined in 1941. The Ashram became world famous. It became the centre of integral yoga and integral education. Sri Aurobindo's Dream of Indian Renaissance. Bharat is Devabhumi (the land of gods), Aryabhumi and Punyabhumi.

India Divided 1947
K. C. Yadav - 1998 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
described, in the later half of 1941, as one of unwillingness to part with power, making the minorities problem an ... It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the ill- fated Cripps Mission of 1942, except to say that Sri Aurobindo (whom I had not seen  ...

Christian Inculturation in India - Page 32
Paul M. Collins - 2007 - ‎Preview
The other instance of an appeal for a religion- less age comes from SriAurobindo . He argues that the time had ... (London, 1971), pp. 280-1, 282. 40 See, S.K. Maitra, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, ( Pondicherry, 1941.

Tantra: Sex, Secrecy, Politics, and Power in the Study of ... - Page 348
Hugh B. Urban - 2007 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
Sri Aurobindo on Himself and the Mother. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Asram Press, 1953. The Supramental Manifestation and Other Writings. ... Town and Country, April 1941, pp. 50, 53, 92-93, 98-100. Gordon, James The Golden Guru: The  ...

Philosophy The Power Of Ideas - Page 604
... (1770-1831) John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) v Manelouise Janssen-Jurnet (1941- ) James Rachels (1941-2003) Susan ... (1659-1719) Rabindranath Tagore (1861 -1941) Mohandas Ghandi (1869- 948) Aurobindo Ghose 1872-1950) Ca os  ...

Approaching Humankind: Towards an Intercultural Humanism
Jörn Rüsen - 2013 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
It may be asked why Aurobindo's ideas, essentially spiritual in nature, should be regarded as a form of humanism. It maybe said that his conception of ... a deep human significance. Rabindranath Tagore Tagore (1861–1941), a poet, artist and ...

Love and the Idea of Europe - Page 172
IV} published between 1933 and 1939, and translator of Shri Aurobindo and D.H. Lawrence. 53. ... moved to Marseilles, where Simone began to contribute to Cahiers, which published her essay on the Iliad in December 1940- January1941.

Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of ...
C. A. Bayly - 2011 - ‎Preview - ‎More editions
Equally, Recovering Liberties contributes to the rapidly developing field of global intellectual history, demonstrating that the ideas we associate with major Western thinkers – Mills, Comte, Spencer and Marx – were received and ...

Women and Men in Love: European Identities in the Twentieth ...
Luisa Passerini - 2012 - ‎Preview
... of poetry (Battements I, II, III, IV) published between 1933 and 1939, and translator of Shri Aurobindo and D.H. Lawrence. ... During the period from September 1941 to the end of the year, Weil wrote two essays on science especially for  ...

Evolutionary Faith: Rediscovering God in Our Great Story - Page 12
1941), John Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829), and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin ( 1881–1955). ... profound than our Western approaches; this strand is eminently represented by the great Indian philosopher and mystic Sri Aurobindo (1939, 1963).

Science and the Indian Tradition: When Einstein Met Tagore
36 G.H. Langley, Sri Aurobindo, Royal India and Pakistan Society, n.d. 37Aurobindo, TheLife Divine, Book 1, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1970, p. 45. ... Modern India and the West, Oxford: Oxford University Press,1941, p.242.

Foundations and Applications of Indian Psychology - Page 76
An introduction to the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. Pondicherry: Sri AurobindoAshram. (Original work published 1941). Mathew, R. J. (2001). The true path: Western science and the quest for Yoga. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing.

Human Values and Education - Page 529
Aruna Goel, ‎S. L. Goel - 2005 - ‎Preview
Ghose, Aurobindo, Hymns of the Atris, Arya 2-3-4, Pondicherry; 1915-16- 17. Ghose, Aurobindo, Life Value of Indian Philosophy, CR 63, May, 1937. Ginsberg ...Isha Upanishad, Ed. Ghose, Aurobindo, Arya Publishing House, Calcutta, 1941 .